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Reading Holocaust Poetry: Singularity and Geoffrey Hill’s ‘September Song’
During the last decade of teaching an interdisciplinary module in Holocaust studies, I have 
found that students outside literary studies often admit that they struggle to read Holocaust 
poetry. They sometimes assume that the poem is an intensely subjective message that needs 
decoding, and contend that poems such as Paul Celan’s ‘Todesfugue’ are unhelpfully opaque. 
I have attempted to persuade them that resistance to accommodation is an integral aspect of 
the literary: as Derek Attridge argues in The Singularity of Literature, literary works precisely 
fail to answer to ‘our habitual needs in processing language’.1 Literature students have then 
pointed out to those from other disciplines that the reader needs the objective tools of close 
reading in order to understand Holocaust poems properly. Such a subjective/objective 
dichotomy between the student groups is telling, and actually demonstrates that non-
specialists in the field may have something important to tell us about reading, as a potentially 
missed encounter in the classroom, and in professional practice. The latter has resulted in 
three different ways of reading Holocaust poetry in recent years: Susan Gubar responds to 
such poems as ‘stymied testimony’, and I have argued elsewhere for the consideration of 
‘awkward poetics’ - in which writers self-consciously discuss the problems of representation 
within the texts – as well as lyrics as a form of testimony in and of themselves.2 This article 
takes these critical positions forward by exploring the interaction between recent theories of 
engaging with poetry more widely, and the specific case of Holocaust poetry. Can the concept 
of the singularity of literature fruitfully account for the ‘events’ of Holocaust poems, or does 
it obscure the importance of the metatext, and possibilities of ethical response? Also, in 
response to Attridge’s work since The Singularity of Literature, can the ‘objective’ close 
readings that critics and literature students engage in be too ‘powerful’ for Holocaust poetry?3
1
Attridge demonstrates a way of reading poems in The Singularity of Literature that 
draws heavily on, but is also subtly different to, traditional close readings.4 His approach 
attends to the singular ‘event’ of the utterance and performance of poems, and how they – and 
literature more widely - can be read at different times in various ways that should still be 
attentive to the materiality of the work. What, I ask in this article, are the challenges of 
singularity to the reading of Holocaust poetry, and how, conversely, might Holocaust poems 
challenge theories of the singular? In a subsequent article, Attridge argues persuasively that 
practical criticism – still widely (and rightly) taught - can fail to engage with poems 
adequately, since the advent of syntactical complexity, rhyme, assonance (etc.) can be found 
in examples of writing (he cites Bob Dylan’s lyrics) that many critics would not find 
singular.5 Attridge’s approach to poetry in general opens out the possibility that close reading 
could fail to respond adequately to Holocaust poetry, if it is not attentive to the materiality 
and performance of the poems. In addition, practical criticism could be charged with an 
inability to provide an adequate ethical response to witness literature. In this context, does 
Attridge’s work similarly have to confront a missed opportunity with testimony, because of 
singularity’s resistance to the pressure of the metatext, and the ways in which Holocaust 
literature is consumed; for example, through Susan Suleiman’s notion of the ‘conventional’, 
where readers may assume the autobiographical ‘truth’ of the text due to the way in which the 
book is marketed?6 These questions will be explored in relation to one of the most well-
known Holocaust poems by a non-survivor: Geoffrey Hill’s ‘September Song’. Hill is a 
British poet who worked as a Professor of Literature and Religion at the University of Boston 
between 1988 and 2006. ‘September Song’, along with another poem from the same 
collection (‘Ovid in the Third Reich’), is printed in the most popular anthology of poems for 
Holocaust studies modules: Hilda Schiff’s Holocaust Poetry.7 Hill’s archive was inaugurated 
at the University of Leeds in 2012, and includes substantial drafts of ‘September Song’: his 
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notebooks make the sequence of writerly events leading to the potential achievement of 
singularity easier to track.     
Attridge’s theory of singularity attempts to account for the elusive pleasures and 
‘potency that we experience in reading [literature]’, and is opposed to the ‘pragmatic 
utilization’ of texts in instrumentalist criticism.8 His book responds to a common perception 
of reading that is rarely commented on in literary criticism, and which is heightened when 
encountering shorter forms of literature such as poetry. Critics invariably use the present 
tense in their accounts of literary texts, which obscures the fact that when they read the same 
texts at different times, varied responses and foci can ensue. In relation to poetry, the reader 
may savour different combinations of, for example, memorable phrases, syntactical echoes, 
or rhythmic effects. This variety should focus the critic on the performance of literature in 
subsequent readings; what Attridge terms, ‘the linguistic event comprehended in its 
eventness’ (p.95). As with M. H. Abrams’s recent focus on the materiality and sound of the 
poem, Attridge draws attention to ‘a sense of [the poem’s] real-time unfolding’ (p.71). In The 
Fourth Dimension of a Poem and Other Essays, Abrams similarly focuses on the utterance of 
poems, but – unlike Attridge – he centres on the ways in which poets ‘exploit the physical 
aspect of language’.9 Rather than respond to poems as merely vehicles for meaning, Attridge 
ponders ‘how best to perform a text’s engagements with linguistic power’ (p.98), and Abrams 
how to explain the potency and ‘palpability of [the poem’s] material medium’ (p.3). ‘Power’ 
is used to explicate such impressive linguistic moments several times in The Singularity of  
Literature, but it is applied negatively to some critics’ deployment of language in Attridge’s 
subsequent article on close reading, which I discuss later in this article.10 
It is not surprising that, despite the widespread acclaim for Attridge’s book, poetry 
critics have, on the whole, continued in their practice as if the ‘event’ of this singular 
criticism never happened.11 During the theory wars many poetry critics were equally stubborn 
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(with, in this instance, good reason) in their adherence to close reading over the machinations 
of instrumentalist theory. Attridge accounts for this tenacity as a partly excusable adherence 
to the notion of a text’s singularity, even if such critics would never explain their views in 
such terms (p.10). As he points out, ‘New Critical preconceptions and procedures – born in 
the second third of the twentieth century – still govern a great deal of literary pedagogy and 
critical practice, as a glance at most “introductions to literature” will quickly reveal’ (p.12). 
Attridge is characteristically modest in his claim that he is not proposing a new way of 
reading: his focus on the ‘eventness’ of literature has the potential to transform literary 
studies, even if, in reality, it is unlikely to dissuade many critics from instrumentalist 
approaches.12 As opposed to the New Critical techniques noted above, he argues that much of 
current literary criticism brings pre-conceived ideas to bear on the reading of subsequent texts 
in order to process them efficiently (pp.6-10). Such a danger of drawing the ‘other’ of the 
literary text into the ‘same’ ideological tapestry surrounds the conclusions of John Barrell’s 
critique of practical criticism, in which a focus on ‘balance’ in literary texts is suspiciously 
bourgeois, and does not take account of the class and gender status of readers.13 Instead, 
Attridge calls for critical vigilance against unreflective instrumentalism, and ideological 
readings that fail in their ‘responsibility to the text and to the institution of literature’ (p.119). 
Later in this article, however, I ask: does the reader’s responsibility consist primarily of an 
appreciation of singularity, or with the initiation of a ‘committed’ response that might go 
beyond the black print on the white page?  
In his subsequent discussion of William Blake’s ‘The Sick Rose’, Attridge utilizes 
familiar techniques of close reading in order to outline the singularity of the poem, including 
an analysis of register (p.68), ambiguity, apostrophe, and rhythm (p.69). Just as the critic 
must be wary of instrumentalism, however, Attridge’s later research proposes that close 
reading itself is not a panacea, and also has an ability to distort the potential singularity of a 
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literary text. The critic may, for example, be so concerned with their own rhetorical 
pyrotechnics that the ‘otherness’ of the poem in question becomes lost in the expression of 
the critic’s ingenuity. Tools of close reading can in this sense be too ‘powerful’.14 Attridge 
recounts the eminent Christopher Ricks recalling a scene in which the young William 
Empson impressed I.A. Richards with his bravura account of a Shakespeare sonnet. Empson 
is meta-critical and modest, arguing that ‘“You could do that with any poetry”’. Ricks retorts 
that such superb criticism can only happen ‘“if the poetry truly teems”’. Attridge takes issue 
with this fait accompli: it allows Ricks to conclude that pyrotechnic criticism will always 
arise a priori from intricate literature. The former then exposes the limitations of close 
reading in relation to Ricks’s account of Dylan’s lyrics: Ricks lauds a passage in ‘Lay Lady 
Lay’ due to its deployment of parallel syntax, rhyme, internal assonance and syntactical 
echoes, but Attridge points out that it would be easy to construct poetic lines that have the 
same features, but which would be banal.15 Ricks’s most effective technique is to ‘draw on 
the language of the lines in his own description, creating the illusion of an extraordinarily 
close relationship between his words and Dylan’s’. Attridge follows with several examples of 
this ‘power’ from Ricks’s wider criticism, in which the latter’s ‘immense skill as a writer is 
deployed to move, delight and persuade the reader’. These examples can be extended to 
Ricks’s criticism on Geoffrey Hill’s work: in his essay ‘“The Tongue’s Atrocities”’ - named 
after a phrase from Hill’s poem ‘History as Poetry’ - Ricks produces a swarm of Empsonian 
rabbits from Hill’s phrase ‘regaled with slaughter’ (from Mercian Hymns). The astonishing 
sentence reads as follows: ‘Regaled, with its regalia (and regalo means a gift); but ‘regaled 
with slaughter’ opens up a grim fissure – the poem uses the word ‘fissured’ – between the 
barbaric opulence and the jaded prurience: regaled with good stories, with Christmas fare (the 
poem speaks of ‘Christ’s mass’), and with deliciously domesticated slaughter’.16 The 
parenthetical connections to the source text, and their assurances that the poem ‘uses’ and 
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‘speaks’ of similar linguistic regalia, concur with Ricks’s reading of the intervention of 
brackets in Hill’s work, which, he states, include and restrain at the same time (p.62). Ricks’s 
opulent rhetoric is barely contained in the sentence quoted above, and can be easily parodied, 
but only - as Attridge stresses - because the writing is so distinctive, and singular, in its own 
right.  
If Attridge is correct that Ricks does not prove the singularity of Dylan’s lyrics, then 
Ricks would seem to be on surer ground in relation to Hill’s work, which, as many critics 
have claimed, truly does ‘teem’. Yet, thinking through the implications of Attridge’s article in 
relation to Holocaust poetry in particular, is it somehow obscene for a critic to revel in their 
own mastery of rhetoric when discussing a poem about atrocity? Would it be histrionic to 
suggest that that this indulgence would be symptomatic of a fascistic approach to literature, in 
which the critic, with apparently cool objectivity, presses their rhetorical claims above the 
performance of the Holocaust poem itself, and, potentially, the mediated voice of the victim? 
Should the critic be somehow ‘quieter’, passive, open and more attentive when reading 
Holocaust poems (and any wider form of Holocaust literature), rather than capitulate to the 
pleasure of their own ‘powerful’ readings? Should Holocaust poetry ‘speak for itself’; and, if 
so, how is this possible?17 When students outside literary studies contend that practical 
criticism misses the point of Holocaust poetry, they are presenting a similar argument to 
Attridge about close reading, but for the wrong reason. There are disadvantages to a lack of 
disciplinary knowledge: Attridge would never argue that poems are overly rhetorical forms of 
language that, once the rhetoric is stripped away, will reveal a clear, prosaic statement. In 
relation to all forms of literature, not just Holocaust poetry, we should be meta-critical, close 
read with care, and be aware of the pitfalls of overly-rhetorical criticism: hence this article 
ends with a critique of my following reading of ‘September Song’ in order to draw attention 
to the ethical difficulties of reading that practical criticism potentially obscures.18 
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The Singularity of ‘September Song’
How could I perform a reading of this poem that emphasises its singularity? Attridge 
emphasises that accounts of singular literature change in subsequent readings: after 
commenting on the linguistic power of ‘The Sick Rose’, he offers the caveat that, ‘if I read 
the poem tomorrow, I will experience its singularity differently’ (p.70). This is certainly true 
of my encounter with ‘September Song’ twenty years after first writing about it, in which I 
stressed, for example, how the diction about economy represents the economic ways (or lack 
of them) in which the Nazis disposed of their victims.19 I would still support this reading, but 
wish to account for how I experience the poem differently now. Abrams’ focus on the 
materiality of poems influences the following reading, and the drafts in Hill’s archive make 
the critic appreciate more acutely the suggestive richness and precision of words such as 
‘flake’. Semantic ambiguity is the starting point for Attridge’s account of the singularity of 
‘The Sick Rose’: the words have a ‘density of suggestiveness’ (p.68) and ‘multiplying 
significations’ (p.69) which activate ‘unfurling meanings’ (p.69). Accounts of ‘September 
Song’ by Jon Silkin and Christopher Ricks respond fully to its semantic richness; the poem’s 
‘density’ certainly constitutes one reason for the poem’s status as one of the most 
anthologised Holocaust poems by a non-survivor, just as much as the later stanza of awkward 
poetics.20 
As in the opening line of ‘The Sick Rose’ (‘O rose, thou art sick’), at the beginning of 
‘September Song’ the reader experiences an ‘arresting initial statement’, and a ‘strongly 
articulated phrasal movement’ (p.69): 
Undesirable you may have been, untouchable
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you were not. Not forgotten
or passed over at the proper time.21
The development from ‘untouchable’ to ‘undesirable’ is immediately striking, and Hill’s 
notebooks reveal that he wrestled with various possibilities for the initial word: ‘wretched’ 
becomes ‘polluted’ on the next page, then ‘Animal’, which, above it, has the words ‘Odious’ 
and ‘Unlovely’.22 Above these rejected suggestions, a box surrounds ‘Undesirable’ with six 
ticks: it forms a concretion of Yeats’s argument that a poem clicks shut like a box when the 
right words are found.23 The semantic development from ‘untouchable’ to ‘undesirable’ is in 
place by the third page of the drafts, although here the words appear on separate lines:
‘Undesirable’ you may have been
Untouchable you were not
Neither forgotten nor passed over
At the allotted time (p.120)
The quotation marks around ‘Undesirable’ (which are still present in the subsequent 
notebook) indicate that Hill was concerned, at this stage, about a perpetrator voice entering 
the poem. By this point, the repetition of ‘un’ is already key to the euphonious language of 
the opening stanza, however, which continues with the repetition of ‘you/you’, and ‘not/Not’ 
in the final version. These performed repetitions and variations form part – if we follow 
Abrams and read the poem aloud – of the memorable ‘evolution of the speech units’ (p.5).24 
‘Not’ following ‘not’ encourages the reader to think of the possible meaning of a double 
negative at the same time as the punctuation denies it: a critic writing in the style of Ricks 
might state, creating the ‘illusion of an extraordinary close relationship’ between the poem 
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and response, that the addressee is ‘not not’ forgotten; in other words, the addressee is indeed 
forgotten in the poem.25 
Any performance of this stanza would stress, as well as the repetitions, the bilabial 
plosives of the /b/ and /p/ sounds, which create an underlying tone of bitterness which works 
against the perpetrator rhetoric. The euphony and semantic depth are also heightened through 
the ambiguity of address. As an ‘event’ of reading, the reader is drawn to the epigraph before 
this first stanza (‘born 19.6.32 – deported 24.9.42’), and must wonder about the identity of 
the addressee.26 The archives reveal that the poem was originally entitled ‘Elegy’, and then 
‘Elegy for E-P’.27 ‘E-P’ refers to ‘Edita Polláková’: as well as the deportation date, the drafts 
include in the potential epigraph the information: ‘died Auschwitz, Oct. 4.1944’, and ‘for a 
little Jewish girl, died 24/9/42’.28 Polláková produced one of the pictures that was included in 
a collection of children’s drawings from Terezín: Hill came across her work in an exhibition, 
and would have immediately noticed the proximity of their birth dates.29 Much of Hill’s work 
– as in The Triumph of Love – conveys his sense (and relief) that he was too young to be part 
of the events of World War Two that nevertheless continue to haunt him: the Polláková date 
indicates what happened to some of the children of the same age on mainland Europe. Hill’s 
decision to excise some of the information about Polláková – no doubt because an extended 
epigraph would have been clumsy - means that, in a performance of the poem, the unnamed 
child is a specific addressee, and representative of all child victims. She is ‘not not forgotten’: 
the poem remembers her through the epigraph, but then ‘forgets’ her as a specific victim. The 
excision means that the poem works as a more general Holocaust elegy, but this process of 
achieving singularity, set against the horror of the signified referent of Polláková’s death, 
points to the possibility of aesthetic larceny that Hill will explore further in the well-known 
third stanza.   
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Thoughts of artistic exploitation are inseparable from the perpetrator rhetoric of words 
such as ‘estimated’, ‘sufficient’, and ‘routine’ in the second stanza, which I focussed on in my 
previous reading: 
As estimated, you died. Things marched,
sufficient, to that end. 
Just so much Zyklon and leather, patented
terror, so many routine cries.30 
‘Things marched’ creates an intertextual link to ‘Things happen’ in ‘Ovid in the Third Reich’, 
the opening poem of King Log.31 After the recent ‘turn’ to perpetrators in Holocaust studies, it 
can also be seen more clearly that the latter poem is prescient in its engagement with a 
perpetrator perspective. ‘Things happen’ intimates the speaker’s lack of control over the 
‘troughs of blood’, whereas the poem as a whole presents someone at least complicit with 
historical events. Similarly, ‘Things marched’ avoids culpability; the phrase may also echo 
the March of Time, which was a newsreel series shown in movie theatres between 1935 to 
1951, and which suggests, in its title, a (potentially fascistic) inevitability of historical 
‘progress’.32 Alongside this semantic density, reading the poem aloud draws attention to the 
stanza’s materiality: the repeated /t/s, and velar plosive of the /k/ in ‘Zyklon’, again evoke a 
bitter and ironic tone that undermines the perpetrator rhetoric. The harsh /t/ sounds work most 
memorably in the shortest line, both in sense of the graphic surface, and number of syllables. 
‘[S]ufficient, to that end’ repeats the sound three times, and emphasises the horror that ‘end’ 
implies, but the poem – without the lost knowledge of Polláková’s death - cannot represent. 
The ‘teeming’ diction also counters the expectations of other words: the reader might expect 
‘Efficient’ rather than ‘Sufficient’; in other words, the process of killing was sufficient but 
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chaotic, and certainly not efficient. ‘Sufficient’ then reaches forward to the variation of ‘Just 
so much’: the initial word at the beginning of the line stresses the irony between ‘Just’ in its 
noun and adverb form; these actions are patently only ‘just’ from a perpetrator perspective. 
This Ricksian rhetoric would also stress the semantic link between the ‘patented/ Terror’ of a 
totalitarian government and the ‘leather’ before ‘patented’. As the reader performs the poem, 
the word initially seems to qualify ‘leather’: ‘patented’ refers to japanned leather with a 
glossy finish. As with the emphasis on ‘Just’ at the beginning of the antecedent line, the stress 
on ‘terror’ at the beginning of the next one then underlines the chilling concept of a 
Government-controlled distribution of fear.33 
After the euphony and semantic richness of the first two stanzas, it is hard to recreate 
the ‘distinctiveness and surprisingness’ many readers sense when they then read, for the first 
time, the most famous lines of this poem (and post-Holocaust poetry as a whole).34 Early on 
in the drafts, the third stanza appears as follows: 
I have made
An elegy for myself. That
Is true.35
This self-castigatory section is almost complete long before the other stanzas, and indicates 
that singularity for artists sometimes comes more easily than achieving ‘the same’ (such as 
metrical regularity). There are only slight variations across the two notebooks, as when Hill 
extrapolates:
[...] That
Is true. For me only, [...]
11
[line break]
Is such a luxury allowed (p.37).
The lines are genuinely original due to the introduction into the cultural matrix of what 
Attridge terms ‘a germ, a foreign body, that cannot be accounted for by its existing codes and 
practices’.36 This stanza destabilizes the poem, and the genre of Holocaust poetry. When the 
poem was composed in 1965-6, no other post-Holocaust poet had introduced the possibility 
of aesthetic larceny into a poem so blatantly. This ‘nested’ singularity (p.64) simultaneously 
opens out the chance of resisting exploitation through awkward poetics, which are embodied 
in a rigorous examination of metre and syntax as it operates in the stanza. After the 
astonishing declaration, the break on ‘made’ is heightened in performance, and works against 
the syntax; the metre then reverts to iambic tetrameter (as in the line before ‘I have made’). 
This metrical break on ‘made’ is significant: referring to the ‘making’ of the whole poem, it 
deliberately upsets the rhythm of the iambs in the previous two lines. Metrics are here not just 
aesthetic drapery: they form an integral part of the poem’s uniqueness and singularity.37 
The taut metrics of the third stanza then give way to the /t/ sounds of the penultimate 
stanza, which underline the obscene luxuriousness of the poet’s September, and pre-
Holocaust aestheticisations of the autumn:
September fattens on vines. Roses
flake from the wall. The smoke
of harmless fires drifts to my eyes.
As I have argued previously, there are echoes of Keats and Hardy’s work in this stanza.38 
These links explain the poem’s uniqueness, but not its singularity. In performance, the velar 
plosives in ‘flake’ and ‘smoke’ undermine the opulence of the fattening vines. As Hill has 
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argued in relation to the exactitude of rhyme, such effects must appear to the reader ‘as 
natural as breathing’, and yet they are the product of intense labour.39  In the notebooks, Hill 
works his way towards ‘flake’ after several variations: roses first ‘Crack’ and ‘Drop’ from the 
wire, and then ‘decay’, ‘burst’, ‘gash’ and ‘soften’ on the next page, before ‘Flake from’ is 
circled with approval; ‘blood-red roses’ is rejected as too clumsy.40 Semantic precision then 
continues in the last line and stanza, in which, instead of the ‘crescendo of intensity’ in ‘The 
Sick Rose’, we experience the singularity of memorable bathos: ‘This is plenty. This is more 
than enough’. ‘This’ could refer to the last stanza, the penultimate stanza, and the entire 
poem: Hill emphasises the ambiguity with two metrical breaks on the most important word, 
which – along with the punctuation - slow the pace of the line. Hill’s sensitivity to metrics 
emphasises the caution and forbearance of the post-Holocaust poet, but ‘This’ also 
‘challenges cultural norms’, and its ‘web of associations’, in which we are meant to pity the 
child victim automatically.41 Just one broken pentameter (the only one in the poem) is 
enough: Hill is wary – to rephrase Wilfred Owen – of putting too much pity into the poetry, 
and questions the troubling ease in which readers might be drawn into expressing whatever 
pity and empathy might mean.42 Clearly, ‘enough’ is an important word in the development of 
the poem, since it occurs first in a different line: ‘Just so much Zyklon and rubber, enough/ 
Terror, so many routine lies’.43 In the context of King Log, ‘enough’ extends to the palinode 
of ‘September Song’, ‘I Had Hope When Violence Was Ceas’t’. This poem is printed 
opposite ‘September Song’ (p.18): it adopts the voice of a camp inmate, and risks being 
‘enough’ after only four lines, with descriptions of the ‘flesh oozing towards its last outrage.’ 
‘[E]nough’, the emphatic last iamb, also functions like ‘finished’, the last word of ‘Funeral 
Music’ (p.32): both words, rich in semantic allusion, draw attention to the poems’ ‘snapping 
shut like a box’; the dying soldier in ‘Funeral Music’ cries that he is not finished at the same 
time as, mortally wounded, he is finished, and the poem is finishing. Manuscript versions of 
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‘Funeral Music’ separate the drafts of ‘September Song’: the notebooks prove that Hill was 
thinking about the ending of both poems simultaneously, as the repeated phrase ‘“I have not 
finished”’ is written into the early drafts of ‘September Song’.44 
The singular last line also draws attention to the finite nature of singularity. For a 
variety of reasons, a poem read in a hundred years’ time may not have the same resonance as 
it does today. ‘September Song’ is an astonishing product of its historical moment, written at 
a time when post-Holocaust writers were beginning to intensify their engagements with war 
atrocities, particularly after the Eichmann Trial in 1961. The poem challenges the notion of 
Holocaust representation, and errs on the side of a respectful silence, or the poetics of 
awkwardness. Such deliberations, and self-censorship, are evident in some of the first lines in 
the notebook, which were rejected as, presumably, stilted and overly pious:
Let them keep
[line break]
their dignity
of silence in death (6)
Hill initially wishes Holocaust victims to be ‘silent’ at the same time as he threatens their 
dignity by beginning to write about that silence. However, if, nearly fifty years after the 
completion of the poem, we are moving into an era of ‘impious’ representation – as Matthew 
Boswell argues – then it is possible to imagine a time in which this tentativeness towards 
Holocaust representation will be regarded quizzically.45 Artists and critics in the US and 
Britain do not, over a hundred years after the events, worry about aesthetic larceny in relation 
to the Crimean War (1853-56) or the American Civil War (1861-65). ‘Locust Songs’ in King 
Log contains a section on the massacre at Shiloh Church in 1862, but, with the lack of 
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intervening awkward poetics, there are no lines that counterbalance the arresting aesthetics of 
the ‘Bland vistas milky with Jehovah’s calm’ (p.17); such imagery is clearly not ‘enough’ in 
the context of the Civil War. Boswell discusses the impieties of Sylvia Plath and W.D. 
Snodgrass in, for example, the form of the latter’s imagined Nazi monologues in The Führer  
Bunker: as the Holocaust continues ‘dying’ – as Guber puts it – we are likely to encounter 
more post-Holocaust poems in the style of Plath and Snodgrass rather than ‘September Song’. 
Nevertheless, and intriguingly, the drafts of Hill’s poem contain lines of impiety that do not 
feature in the final version:   
His one idea in
love was being
sucked off by his
friends’ wives.46  
These words appear on the same page as Hill wrestles with the possibilities for ‘flake’, and 
are no doubt an aside rather than a proposed stanza of ‘September Song’. Even so, they 
indicate that the respectful tone of the poem has to be carefully constructed, rather than being 
an effortless default position: such singularity has to be ‘tuned from the clamour’ of 
competing – and sometimes impious – discourses both within and outside the notebooks.47
The ethics of close reading 
In the reading above, I have outlined why I think ‘September Song’ is the most memorable 
post-Holocaust poem in terms of its singularity and materiality, rather than any 
instrumentalist reason extraneous to the text. However, it is possible that – as with Attridge’s 
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reading of Ricks - close readings of the poem could be too ‘powerful’, over-determined, and 
insular in their focus on the text.48 If Hill’s short poem is ‘enough’ about Polláková, maybe 
the critic should be aware of when they have written ‘enough’ on an aspect of post-Holocaust 
literature. If this article ended before the subsection, would there be a failure to apprehend, or 
an obfuscation of, the limitations of critical rhetoric in my reading above? Perhaps there is 
something beyond the aesthetic trickery of the elegy for itself, and the singularity of its 
performance, that is important in reading and apprehending the poem. Any account of the 
poem’s singularity will emphasise its literariness, but does close reading obscenely forget the 
metatext, the fate of the child, and neglect the possibility of a different kind of readerly 
witnessing? Just as Tom Paulin was appalled at Ricks’s attention to linguistic minutiae in 
Minatour, the former critic might be exasperated to read someone discussing the poetry of 
atrocity in terms of fricatives.49 
Singularity might be critiqued as indulging in an ahistorical ‘divine liberty’, apparent, 
as Albert Camus writes, ‘“in the work of Mozart”’.50 Camus argues instead that contemporary 
art loses ‘“Ease”’ with its ‘“constant obligation”’ to history, so that the artist is now ‘“lying”’ 
or ‘“indulging in useless woes if he pays no attention to history’s woes”’ (p.115). Yet singular 
writing can still engage with the uneasiness of history, as Attridge demonstrates with his 
account of Mongane Wally Serote’s ‘The actual Dialogue’ in The Singularity of Literature  
(pp.112-8): this poem was written during the era of Apartheid in South Africa, and the 
‘Context is already there in the words’ (p.114). Instead of recourse to instrumentalist 
metanarratives, a ‘charged’ witnessing must therefore confront the large questions of art and 
everyday life, such as, How do we respond to otherness within texts, and beyond our own 
idiocultures? Yet an adequate ethical response to a poem such as ‘September Song’ cannot be 
the impossibility of thinking about the poem constantly, as Primo Levi demands of his poem 
‘Shemà’.51 It might constitute the more manageable response of dwelling on the poem for a 
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while, and ‘living’ with it, but this could be a self-deceptive ethical move in that, as Hill puts 
it in another poem, the text may be forgotten next week as the reader moves on to more 
pressing events.52 Attridge’s work draws attention to the ethics of accounting for a text’s 
singularity and literariness, but, having done so in relation to ‘September Song’, is it 
unethical to finish with the poem, and then, as Patricia Yaeger writes in relation to consuming 
trauma, put the text away and the butter the next bagel?53 
How, in other words, do we - to re-phrase Paul Celan - witness for the witness?54 
What does it mean to be part of a ‘chain of witnesses’, as Shoshana Felman discusses in The 
Future of Testimony?55 In Felman’s essay, the chain consists of literary and philosophical 
figures who engage with each other’s work, from Sigmund Freud through Jacques Derrida to 
Cathy Caruth, but what does it mean for lesser mortals to respond ethically to autobiography, 
and vicarious testimony? One answer is to respond carefully, as Attridge suggests, to the 
aesthetics of representation, and avoid a reading that colonises the experience of the other: 
poets such as Wilfred Owen and Charlotte Delbo deliberately resist such attempts at over-
identification with their autobiographical material.56 For Attridge, the ethics of ‘sympathy’ 
are more productive than empathy: whilst there is a danger that ‘a term like this may seem to 
imply a simple matching between mind and work, it helpfully captures something of the 
positive openness that characterizes a fully responsive reading’ (p.81). How, however, can the 
critic be sympathetic towards the absent voice of the victim in a post-Holocaust text? An 
openness to ‘September Song’ must acknowledge that there is no metatext, in the sense that 
Polláková’s fate - beyond the death date - is unknown: the poet has the choice to desist from 
writing a poem, to let the victims keep ‘their silence of dignity/ in death’, or, alternatively, to 
elegise the few details we know about Polláková in a more general elegy, where the material 
demands of poetry strive (as Hill’s notebooks indicate) for singularity, with the self-conscious 
injection of awkward poetics. In other Holocaust poems, the metatext functions differently: in 
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Jerzy Ficowski’s ‘5.8.1942: In Memory of Janusz Korczak’, it is ‘in’ the text in Attridge’s 
sense that it is embodied in the poem’s words (p.114), but it is also considered outside the 
poem in a footnote.57 Ficowski’s poem, like ‘September Song’, is included in Holocaust  
Poetry: a twenty-line footnote explains Korczak’s refusal to escape from the Warsaw ghetto 
so he could continue to look after orphaned children, and his subsequent decision to 
accompany them to Treblinka (p.63). Even allowing for the ‘flattening’ effects of translation, 
and the arresting line about the ‘scurrying lice of fear’ (p.62), a suspicion remains that the 
metatextual narrative about the remarkable doctor is more important than the materiality of 
the poem itself. Poetry functions here not as potentially singular literature, but as an 
instrumental route to an astonishingly heroic narrative.58 In contrast, the singularity of 
‘September Song’ is itself inextricable from an ethical stance. As I noted in Holocaust Poetry, 
critics could still dismiss awkward poetics as sanctimonious, and still exploitative, but the 
alternative is silence, or unreflective poetics that blithely aestheticise historical atrocity.59 
These examples indicate that Holocaust poetry, even when examined alongside 
considerations of the metatext, does not crudely refute the notion of singularity. Far from it: 
as Attridge argues, the discovery of, for example, previously unknown biographical details 
can profoundly change the way a reader interprets singular literature. In relation to ‘The Sick 
Rose’, ‘Further information about the conditions under which Blake wrote the poem, about 
the literary and popular traditions on which he was drawing, about the connotation of words 
current in his time, may all feed into the singularity I both create and undergo when I next 
read it’ (p.70). However, the example of the Ficowski poem indicates that in studies of 
Holocaust poetry – and Holocaust literature more widely – the metatext has the potential to 
function as a fetish that obscures the fact that there are many well-meaning but poorly written 
examples of Holocaust poems. Reading Holocaust poetry should provide more than the 
disarming sentiment displayed in, for example, Adam Zych’s anthology The Auschwitz  
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Poems: the opening lyric, Janka Abrami’s ‘Last Lullaby’, imagines the author’s sister 
accompanying her daughter into the gas chamber, and ends with the whisper of ‘the last 
lullaby of Auschwitz:/ “Shash, my darling, Shash...”.’60 Nevertheless, the historian Otto Dov 
Kulka admits that the ‘“safe and well-paved way of scientific discipline”’ does not allow him 
to confront, and make sense, of his childhood memories of Birkenau: similarly, is it possible 
that the disciplinary pressures of close reading entail missed encounters with poems such as 
‘Last Lullaby’?61 Yet reading literature, Attridge argues, ‘understood in its difference from 
other kinds of writing (and other kinds of reading), solves no problems and saves no souls’ 
(p.4). What Holocaust poetry certainly does do, however, is focalise the specific ways of 
reading relevant to all forms of testimony, autobiography, and memoir, as opposed to 
literature in general. The context, as Attridge argues, is ‘in’ the text, ‘already there in the 
words’ (p.114), but when the metatext is obscured - as in case of false testimony - one of the 
primary tasks of the reader is to pick through the pitfalls of the ‘conventional’, and address 
the key issue of who is writing to whom. Some readers, such as Sue Vice, may detect 
singularity in Benjamin Wilkomirski’s Fragments, but it still makes a vast difference to 
reading, interpreting and evaluating the book as to whether the author was a child survivor of 
the Holocaust, like Otto Dov Kulka, or a child living in a Switzerland orphanage.62 As 
Wilkomirski’s novel demonstrates, the singular can exist aside from such troubling matters of 
authorship and library classification. The specific case of false testimony also demonstrates 
that singularity, so important to the ‘pleasures and the potency’ of literature can, like the 
power of close reading, be unethical.  
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